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THE IDEOLOGY OF SELECTIVE FORGETTING 
 HOW A POLITICAL MASSACRE IS REMEMBERED IN TURKEY:  
The ‘33 Bullets Incident1’ 
 
Introduction 
When I began my study of the ‘Sociology of Border’ encompassing Turkey’s borders to Iraq, 
Iran and Syria, I indeed had no intention or even an idea that I would be engaged in the subject 
discussed here in this article. I intended only to trace the evidence of a political massacre (the so-
called ‘33 Bullets Incident’) taking place in 1943. But in doing so I began to comprehend how 
and to what degree our cognitive models of remembering are reshaped, how things had been 
forgotten and why they were later recalled in retracing the memory of what shapes a nation 
within the geographic boundaries of a country
2
. 
I will use the results of my Sociology of Border study
3
 and the 33 Bullets Incident as a 
case-study to elaborate on the selectiveness of remembering and forgetting and on the ideology 
that lies beneath this phenomenon. My aim is to discuss both the politics that shape the border 
and the rhetoric of its positions and how and to what degree people in border regions can 
mobilize these position and rhetoric in order to establish relations with the state
4
. I will examine 
not only their conflicts but also their accommodations with the state.  
While investigating the 33 Bullets Incident, the concept of ‘remembering’ constituted the 
initial foundation of the research. As the research developed and the multi-layered narrative of 
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 This article was originally presented at the conference ‘Generations, Experiences, Testimonies’, 
organized by Tarih Vakfı [History Foundation] in September 2003. For his study, I have 
conducted research in Van, Turkey, in Özalp and Saray districts, and in the border villages 
Sırımlı (H(X)arapsorik), Damlacık (Rasik) and Değirmigöl (Milaningiz). Also see Özgen 2003. 
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 Based on five-year’s empirical research in the villages and towns situated along Turkey’s 
borders with Iraq, Iran and Syria, this project entitled ‘The Sociology of Border (County Towns)’ 
utilized the methods of visual anthropology, the transcriptions of ‘recordings and in-depth 
interviews’, historical records, documents and textual analysis. I thank Alp Buğdaycı and my 
assistant Ferhat Öner who invested much effort in the project and Özlem Biner for her assistance 
in discussing and developing the study. 
 2 
the field unfolded, the frame of the narrative brought forth the concept of ‘selective forgetting’. In 
this way a new research topic of social memory developed which included both remembering and 
forgetting. I understand in the term social memory organic forms of collective remembrance, 
which should be no less challenged than the dominant narrative (governing mythology of 
memory) and the role and the meaning of memory for national identity. In recent years we have 
seen an explosion of studies on memory (Bell 2003). Bell points out: “Memory’, it appears, has 
today assumed the role of a meta-theoretical trope and also, perhaps, a sentimental yearning; as 
the idea of an Archimedean Truth has slowly and painfully withered under the assault of various 
anti-foundational epistemologies, memory seems to have claimed Truth's valorized position as a 
site of authenticity, as a point of anchorage — albeit an unsteady one — in a turbulent world 
stripped of much of its previous meaning. In memory we trust” (Bell 2003: 65). Bell reveals the 
very ideological terrain behind the threat of history being replaced in its entirety by memory. This 
not only paves the way for semantic confusion, it also facilitates the obscuring of a crucial 
political phenomenon, that is, the role of collective remembering in challenging memory defined 
as the nation’s ‘governing mythology’ (see Bell 2003: 66).  
I will follow a similar path throughout this article. The discussions of the ideology of the 
narrative and the dismantling of this ideology will gradually disappear to be replaced by a belief 
in the absoluteness of remembering. We do not question the ideology of the narrative any more; 
we only doubt the metaphors of memory. While we carry out the discussion of what is being 
remembered, why and how, along the lines of the meaning of memory, we have tended to neglect 
its interpretations. Here my primary aim is to examine the forms of the persistence of the 33 
Bullets Incident within the political history and national memory alongside both the meanings 
and the interpretations of the discourse built around the incident. My second aim concerns the 
role played by the notions of center and periphery in the historical understanding of the event. 
Rather than perceiving these in terms of a binary opposition, I will emphasize the necessity of 
considering the interrelations between peripheral factors and their individual relations to the 
center, the fact that this matrix of relations influences the center, the periphery and those on the 
periphery, and how these influences are exerted, to what degree and of course within which time 
frames. In other words, the aim is to grasp the constructed nature of the alliance between various 
power groups, which hitherto have hardly been felt, have been mostly and forcibly forgotten, 
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 Stuart Hall insists that in a study on politics and its rhetoric, rhetoric should always be given 
positions (Hall 1993). 
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masked with lies and denial, and can therefore only be unveiled through a different reading.  
 
 
 
I. On Methodology and the Case Study 
The 33 BULLETS INCIDENT: “I WAS SHOT IN A SOLITARY CORNER OF THE 
MOUNTAINS
5” 
 
The 33 Bullets Incident, also called the Seyfo River “Massacre” (Geliye Seyfo) by local people, 
refers to the murder of thirty-three Kurdish villagers accused of smuggling in Van-Özalp, Kotor 
River (Kutur-Seyfo) (Aslan 1989: 27), Çilli Mountain Pass (Beşikçi 1992: 85) in 1943. The 
incident has been brought up in diverse contexts in Turkish political history and interpreted 
accordingly: as an act of CHP (Republican People’s Party) violence towards poor villagers in 
1948 (Beşikçi 1992: 15), as a way to exercise control over the CHP’s ruling power and the Prime 
Minister İnönü at the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly) meetings in 1956, as an 
example of the TSK’s (Turkish Armed Forces) violence towards the people and the state 
symbolized by the power of the army in 1970s (Arif 2001), and finally as a particular form of 
oppression and violence towards the Kurdish people after the 1980s (Aslan 1989: 31, 43-44; 
Beşikçi 1992: 45; Göktaş 1991b: 63). The official history of the left knew of this incident from 
Ahmed Arif’s poem ‘Thirty-three Bullets’ and remained content with this interpretation; at the 
same time, the incident was developed on the same basis, although with the opposite 
interpretation in official Turkish history. For example, Kenan Esengin, a comrade-in-arms of 
General Muğlalı, who gave the order to shoot said “It was impossible to control the events in the 
border area according to normal standards….” (Esengin 1974a; 1974b: 21). A most recent 
discussion of this subject emerged in connection with Abdullah Çatlı’s trial. Columnists, 
ideologues, politicians, popular and sometimes populist political scientists debated the “General 
Mustafa Muğlalı Affair” again. The latest news on this subject has been that a barracks on the 
Van-Özalp border in which the villagers had been imprisoned before they were shot was named 
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“…
In a solitary corner of the mountains, at the hour of Morning Prayer, I lie stretched, long, 
bloody… Translated by Murat Nemet-Nejat (1982) Ahmed Arif’s famous eulogistic poem about 
the incident which is memorized by many leftists without being aware of its content (Arif, 2001) 
 
 4 
after General Muğlalı6. 
Divorced of all historicist, ideological and statist interpretations, the basic story of the 33 
Bullets is as follows:  
On the night of July 30, 1943 at landmark No.356, by the Kotor River (Kutur-Seyfo), 
Upper Koçkıran Village, Özalp District in the city of Van, 33 villagers7 were killed without a 
proper trial. The incident was brought up in the TBMM in 1948. Despite an official application 
dated February 7, 1948?
8
, by the DP (Democratic Party) Kütahya Deputy Fikri Apaydın and the 
Eskişehir Deputy İsmail Hakkı Çevik, an examination could only be initiated in 1949. According 
to the verdict number 950-8 dated 02.03.1950, the General Staff Military Court found General 
Mustafa Muğlalı, who had been 3rd Army Inspector in Diyarbakır at the time of the incident, 
guilty and sentenced him to death, although his punishment was later reduced to 20 years 
imprisonment; he died in Ankara Gülhane Military Hospital in 1951 (Beşikçi 1992: 79; Aslan 
1989: 41) and thus his file was closed. After a period of silence between 1951 and 1956, the case 
was re-opened in the TBMM by the DP as a reprisal to the CHP’s accusations of “discrimination 
towards minorities” during the events of September 6-7 (Beşikçi 1992: 78). This time, the 
Assembly demanded the ex-prime minister Ismet İnönü to take up a position, accusing him and 
the entire CHP of complicity. The case, discussed in the TBMM on February 12, 1956 and 
February 25, 1956 was closed because of ‘the limits of action and various amnesty laws’, as was 
concluded within the report of the TBMM Commission of Investigation and the discussions at the 
National Assembly (Beşikçi 1992: 79).  
In the following section I shall consider local knowledge and interpretations of the event. 
Thus this research
9
 is based on oral narratives collected in the course of in-depth interviews using 
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Avni Özgürel “Yarayı Kaşımak: 33 Kursun ve Muğlalı Paşa”; Posta 13 May 2004 “Kışla 
Sürprizi”. 
7
 There are doubts about the number. For instance the number of dead and their names given by 
Beşikçi based on the 1956 TBMM minutes are inconsistent with the data provided by Aslan.  
8
 A second application was submitted by Van deputy Muzaffer Koçak on November 17, 1948. 
BYBS TBMM File C1. 
9
 Within this research, four social structures which have been the subjects and the objects of the 
33 Bullets Incident have been scrutinized. These have been influential around the Hoşap-Kutur-
Ağrı and Mahmudiye region, famous in various periods, and integrated into the state and the 
Republic in different ways: 1) Milan Aşireti, an example of nomadism which builds the networks 
of social relations on rebellion, 2) The Küresins, as a tribal structure without an agha, 3) The 
Birukis as a system of agha (Andrews 1989: 112), 4) The Arvasis, who strengthen their social 
and political ties with sects and religion. The villages affected from the 33 Bullets Incident: 
 5 
oral history techniques, such as the narrative analysis of various written documents and 
interviews with key persons. In addition, I have also included other scholarly works and memoirs 
on family, tribe (aşiret) and national history, which I have treated as narratives and scrutinized 
accordingly. Then I compared the results with historical documents. The differences between 
various narratives could be solved by using historical documents as arbitrators; conflicts between 
documents or other uncertainties required a search for further narratives and a re-examination of 
existing ones. 
Initial questions aimed at ascertaining whether the villagers remembered the 33 Bullets 
Incident at all, if yes, how it was remembered and the role that memory played in their attitude to 
the border. However, as time and the research advanced, the field itself provided the opportunity 
to discern multi-layered truths. Staying for a while in the villages, turning our interviews into 
informal talks, sharing at least a part of their daily life, connecting to people and earning the trust 
of our gatekeepers became integral parts of the research. The stories of the county centers 
(kasaba) and the cities, accusations and judgments, narrative forms used by various social groups 
were collected using methods of visual anthropology. Hour-long sittings, daily chats and all kinds 
of everyday interaction were recorded visually and transcribed.  
A transcription technique described as ‘proceeding via the codes given by life’ was 
applied. In the categorization of the codes, priority was given to the meanings derived from the 
field. The facts were named according to the periods in which they were used and by whom they 
were used in social memory (such as “once revenge is uttered, its blood’s sound remains”). 
Metaphors signifying these facts were assigned a twofold meaning: as attempts at metaphor by 
the people, and second, as construing the discourse. This issue is the focus of the discussion in 
this article.  
Methodologically, a categorical-content perspective is used for narrative analysis.
10
 This 
technique invalidates considerably the dichotomous idea often underlying narrative readings, i.e. 
that there is a contradiction between categorization and contextual analysis. Because, in this 
technique, categorization does not only derive from theory, there is indeed no need to be confined 
                                                                                                                                                              
Sırımlı (H(X)arapsorik) and Değirmiköy (Milaningiz); Damlacık (Raşik), the village of Küresins; 
in-depth interviews and visual anthropology techniques are applied in Van in order to gather 
information on Arvasis and Birukis, and various texts published by the sects, various historical 
documents and official documents are examined. 
10
 In this technique, the main titles of the research area are determined, and the text is divided into 
these categories, classified and grouped. (Lieblich-A & Tuval-Mashiach 1989: 112-115)  
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to the theory, while at the same time the text itself can create its own categories.  
Thereupon the same forms of story-telling were assembled periodically. This was most 
difficult since the telling of stories of enmity or glorification could be different within the same 
period for each social group; the chronology of objectives and subjects targeted by those in power 
did not agree with the chronology of the objectives of the groups from the same aşiret with lower 
status.
11
  
 
II. WHY WE FORGET SELECTIVELY  
 
How absolute is the relationship between ideology and what we remember or forget? More 
importantly, what do we remember, how and why? Who remembers what? We also need to focus 
on the relation between memory and social responsibility. The 33 Bullets Incident is a good 
example for illustrating not only how Turkish political history, but also how the geography of 
citizenship has been shaped. It is the ‘intrinsic’ historical knowledge of events and of the subjects 
and objects of these events. Furthermore, it should also be an example of academia’s 
responsibility to change and undo silences, obscurities of interpretation and negligence in the 
name of ‘objectivity’. 
Van Dijk’s classification of social interfaces explicates the dialectics of the relationship 
between social memory and ideology (Van Dijk 2003: 19-37). In order to deconstruct ideology, 
Van Dijk examines the construction of the ideology and hence connects shared fields, fields of 
perception and attitudes and the field of ideologies and values as the largest socius
12
 as elements 
of social memory. Van Dijk’s description of what he calls the socius resembles Simmel’s analysis 
of the term in three fields: the fields of the reflection of the social on the individual, on the 
institution(al) and on the moral (Freund, 1997: 157-193). Van Dijk also emphasizes the 
dialectical relation between ideology and its reflection in social practice. This practice is realized 
in the production, reproduction and application of ideological knowledge, ideological attitudes 
and cognitive models. However, according to Van Dijk, all these do not necessarily bring 
inevitable results.  
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 The boldface terms in the citations below indicate codes; quotation marks ‘…’ indicate the categories of these 
codes within this text. For example the code “Permitted-Turks” belongs to the category of ‘Pro-us – pro-state’. 
Similarly the code “My grandfather Mehmet Bey was from Hamidiye Regiments” signals the category ‘We were 
also under the rule of this state. We are citizens too’. The code “Our ancestors fought in Çanakkale” is in the 
category ‘We are one of the founding members of the Republic too’. 
12
 Van Dijk uses the concept of socius following Ardent. 1994. 
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In this respect Van Dijk diverges from Bell significantly, who regards memory as the 
inevitable manipulation of social formations. Bell defines all narrative forms of past events and 
the discursive imagination of history as ‘memory’. On the other hand, unlike memory, “the 
governing myth thus coexists with and is constantly contested by subaltern myths, which are 
capable of generating their own traditions and stories, stories as likely to be concerned with past 
oppression and suffering at the hands of the dominant groups as by tales of national glory” (Bell 
2003: 80). This differentiation underscores the manipulations ensuing from the construction of 
the collective memory as a national imagination and fortifies endeavors to liberate oneself from 
the enchantment of common nationalist memory. “The complex interpenetration of myth — in 
both its governing and multifarious subaltern forms — and organic memory (remembrance) can 
best be framed in the context of (and in relation to) a ‘national mythscape’. Such a mythscape 
can be conceived of as the discursive realm, constituted by and through temporal and spatial 
dimensions, in which the myths of the nation are forged, transmitted, reconstructed and 
negotiated constantly. The temporal dimension denotes a historical span, a narrative of the 
passing of years, and it is a narrative that is most likely to include inter alias a story of the 
origins of the nation and of subsequent momentous events and heroic figures.” (Bell 2003: 81). A 
thorough comprehension of this potential is crucial for actors of the critical project. According to 
Bell, our various thought-worlds and imagination-fields are deliberate and ideological, whether 
they are areas of social memory packed with a nationalist construction or the field of myth as a 
sub-field. Immediately after being collected, they may and do actually work as interior and 
exterior fields to each other. Van Dijk’s stance on this state of mutual necessity and the 
mechanisms of influence is more cautious, and he focuses more on the layers of discourse on its 
way to becoming ideology.  
The social sciences have recently begun to dwell on forms of remembering and forgetting 
of the social. Over the last fifteen years, populist socio-political discourses have begun to rewrite 
the narrative of the founding of the Turkish Republic on the basis of totalitarianism. There is no 
need to repeat here that these narratives draw on micro-historical studies. It has become largely 
evident in this period that history writing always incorporates a certain ideological bias. Benedict 
Anderson rejects the idea that nations are the creations of sociological conditions such as race or 
language or that their shape is uniform. Nations are imagined, and nationalism is part of the 
universal history of the modern world. (Anderson 1991) 
Thus, the founding narratives of the Turkish Republic need to be read differently from 
 8 
‘liberal statist’ discourses or from the ‘rational game of the rationally working unequal power 
conflicts narrative’. This text is a diachronic reading (the simultaneous effects of power 
balances/conflicts and worlds of meaning) of the 33 Bullets Incident. Naturally, a diachronic 
reading of history can be applied to one event. Such a reading can proceed by way of establishing 
power balances at the national and international levels. However, as in the case of the 33 Bullets 
Incident, there is a need to discern how powers consequently reproduce the irrationality of life 
while they involve in the rational power games. This duality (rational and irrational) shapes and 
transforms Republican ideology through its various transformations within the history of the 
Turkish Republic.  
In this paper the socius of the subject and object of the event in the 33 Bullets Incident 
will be elaborated on as narratives of interpreted and interpreter. Ali İhsan Bey, the tribal chief of 
the Milan Aşiret, which lost most of its members in the Incident, gives voice to a higher class 
position within the aşiret structure. The Küresins, on the other hand, are marked as the enemies 
of the new age. The Milan is forcibly made the subject of the action, and the Küresins become its 
objects.   
 
 
III. THE RANKING of RESPONSIBILITIES in the Re-CONSTRUCTION of the 
‘TRUTH’  
 
a- The Class-based Composition of the Aşiret: the Milan Aşiret’s Leader Ali Ihsan Bey: “My 
grandfather Mehmet Bey was in a Hamidiye Regiment” 
 
The names were lost first, the names of places and persons, and were then remembered either in 
their earlier or modern forms. The 33 Bullets Incident took place in Özalp district, but according 
to the villagers, its location was Mahmudiye. The history of Özalp was indeed transformed on 
August 19
th
, 1930, during the last days of the Ağrı Revolts. The revolt was suppressed as a result 
of diplomatic cooperation with Iran; Kutur district was ceded to Iran, and Mahmudiye district 
took the name Saray (BYBS TBMM, Record No: 73-84). In 1932, the name of the Saray district 
changed to Kazımpaşa; but then its name was returned after Kazımpaşa moved to Karahallı 
village and changed its name to Özalp (BYBS TBMM No 13422).  
A similar confusion exists in the official records. For example, in the Assembly reports, 
Özalp sometimes is called Kazımpaşa, and the Kotor (Kutur) River became the Kokut River. 
 9 
There is even confusion within the narratives: The name of the military surgeon, who hesitated to 
sign the death report, is Raşit Ersezer in Beşikçi’s account and Raşit Tezer in Aslan’s. More 
importantly, the numbers and the names of the dead given by Beşikçi as based on the death report 
(which is based again on the records of detention in the Assembly minutes) contradict those 
Aslan collected from the villagers. While Beşikçi refers to 32 men and a woman, and states that 
the woman was released since she was Mehmedi Mısto’s daughter, who was employed with the 
Turkish National Intelligence Organization, Aslan gives the names of 33 men without mentioning 
a woman (Beşikçi 1992: 141; Aslan 1989: 21). 
Interviews conducted in two villages and Özalp revealed that there are differences 
between these memoirs, accounts of the villagers and Ali İhsan Bey, the leader of the Milans. The 
common statement is that “before, the state allowed some smuggling, but then retaliated to take 
revenge for the 1500-2000 sheep stolen from Mehmedi Misto (Beşikçi 1992: 27, 141), the agha of 
the smuggler village (Belasor); 80 horsemen surrounded the town’s (Saray’s) cattle; 
consequently some people in Saray became traitors; the dead belonged to the Milan Aşiret and 
were executed without a proper hearing; and they were innocent”. 
Ali İhsan Bey, leader of the Milan Aşiret, who organized his official contacts with the 
state carefully, stressed that ‘plundering was first allowed by the soldiers and this paved the way 
for the emergence of the new tradition of denouncement’:   
 “We [Osman Agha, the father of the leader of the Milan Aşiret, 
Ali İhsan Bey] were in Iran. In Urmiye district [Formerly Rizaiye]. 
Turkish smugglers went [to Urmiye district]; maybe they got 
permission from the state. There was the village Belasor, the agha 
Muhammedi Misdo, our relative, from Milan, was there. He was a just 
man… But they went together, took it as a matter of honor. A decision 
to retaliate was made. Together with 80 horsemen, there were other 
aşirets. Saray was a town then. They said “we will take the cattle of 
the town in place of the sheep”. They looked around for a while, but 
the cattle had gone towards the border zone. So they drove the cattle to 
Iran. In compensation for the sheep. Mehmedi Misdo was a relative of 
Ingiz [the village called Milaningiz - Değirmigöl]. The locals, who did 
not like Muhammedi Misdo, denounced him. Apparently, two villages 
were denounced. H(X)arapsorik [Sırımlı] and İngiz [Değirmigöl]. Two 
 10 
persons from Çaybağı [Rune(x)ksar], 16 persons from H(X)arapsorik 
[Sırımlı], 15 persons from Milaningiz [Değirmigöl]13   …The 
denouncement was made by those who did not like us, who were not 
from among us, whose cattle had been stolen, whose homesteads had 
been ruined. Then they summoned 33 persons by name. They were 
taken to Van. The court of justice asks in Van ‘what do they have?’ 
They had nothing. They arrested three persons. They detained 
someone called Abdülbaki from Sırımlı village and three other persons 
separately. Later they were acquitted. All of them were respected 
persons. Even a sergeant came on leave, sergeant Süca. He was one 
of them.” When we asked Ali İhsan Bey whether there was a woman 
among them; he says “I don’t know, we didn’t hear”. “They even 
separated the Kurdish soldiers from among those who were going to 
shoot, so that only soldiers from the western part of the country doing 
their military service here would be involved. The soldiers from the 
west went.  The men’s hands were tied, they were lined upclose to each 
other. İbrahim survived with a wound. He escaped across the Iranian 
border. He pretended to be dead, stood up only after they had gone. 
After 3-5 years, he died too” [from the interview with Ali İhsan Bey, 
on October 28, 2002].  
When we wanted to confirm the incident mentioned also in Beşikçi’s work that Muhemmedi 
Misdo called for İbrahim Özay, who had escaped wounded and was living in Iran as a fugitive, in 
order to make him kiss the hand of a Turkish army officer:  
“There was no hand kissing, no!” he says. “We were in Iran at that 
time, Osman Agha passed away in 1938. At the time of the incident my 
elder brother Rıza Bey was the Milan agha. There is 15 years between 
us. There was a private amnesty. We were of use to the state [Turkey] in 
Iran” [from the interview with Ali Ihsan Bey, on October 28, 2002]. 
Especially three expressions in Ali İhsan Bey’s narrative are conceptualized, and there are three 
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 The confusion regarding the number persists. For instance while Aslan states the number of 
death 33, unlike Ali İhsan Bey, he mentions 25 persons captured from Sırımlıköy; he provides the 
 11 
remarks that need further investigation: “We and the Turks-Westerners”, “One of them was a 
soldier” and “respected persons”.  
 The expression “We and the Turks-Westerners” discloses the traces of a Turkish-
Kurdish conflict of a new era: ‘We’ signifies being situated on the periphery, ‘the Turks-
Westerners’ means to be at the center. This cautious wording further underlines that even the 
executioners were chosen from among the Turks, thus the hands that pulled the trigger were 
Turkish. Us here represents Osman Agha, Ali İhsan Bey and the leadership of the aşiret in the 
first place, but in an extended sense it also encompasses the whole aşiret, all victims and the 
oppressed, and all Kurds. The words in the first lines referring to the “Turks who had received 
permission” were used throughout this research as ‘those who were pro-statists and thus could 
not be counted as Kurds’. The villagers’ and the Milan leader’s formulations “One of them was 
a soldier” and “respected persons” reinforced their innocence and confirmed their leaders’ 
statements. A careful examination of these conceptualizations reveals a revolt against the state’s 
execution of even those who were to considered worthy of being conscripted to the national army 
without an appropriate hearing. Furthermore, it was also a reaction to the arresting of the aşiret’s 
most honored and respected leaders by name. 
Ali İhsan Bey’s choice to use the name Urmiye is worthy of attention. His preference to 
use Urmiye instead of Rızaiye, can be reference to Iran’s political processes and the Arian 
connection. The example represents a case of changing names and the search for an answer to the 
questions, which of these and for what reason have been preserved by social memory, provide an 
interesting clue. Changing the name of the lake during the Khomeini regime from Rızaiye, to 
stress its association with Shah Rıza, to Urmiye, referring to an older period, and the preference 
for this name both in Iran and Turkey, prove Ali İhsan Bey’s awareness of the ‘patriotic’ 
constructions of the ethnic nationalism of the new era.  
Ali İhsan Bey defines Milan as follows:  
“My grandfather Mehmet Bey is from the Hamidiye Regiments, 
Osman Agha is his son. The Milan consists of four branches, and more 
than 100.000 families live around Urfa and Suruç. 30-32 villages 
belong to us. We were in Iran in the winter and in Özalp in the spring 
and summer. Once when the borders were open, we were spending the 
                                                                                                                                                              
names of 25 persons from Sırımlı, 2 from Değirmigöl, one from Çaybağı and 5 from Xretel 
(Kapıköy) (Aslan, 1989).  
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summer in Özalp, but they remained there when the border was drawn. 
He sent two messengers to the agha of Şemsikans, Bashan, and said 
“Give him our greetings, if possible, we shall stay in the villages of 
Özalp this winter”. But Bashan said “I give none of the houses”. So 
the Şemsikans and the Milans fought each other for three months… 
TheŞemsikans were entrapped in Gazlıgöl village castle… [According 
to the story of this conflict] Afterwards they leave the castle and settle 
in the villages of Karahisar-Keçikayası-Kapıköy-Çakmak-Kepir-
Kekikdüzü-Koçbaşı. The Milan’s villages are Örenburç, Çaybağı, 
Baltepe, Zırava, Çardak, Zincirkıran, Dolutaş, Değirmigöl, Bayaslan-
Şerefhane, Sırımlı, Korucan, Yamanyurt, Gazlıgöl, Yeşilalış-Pagan. 
This happened in 1915. In Mehmet Agha’s time. My grandfather went 
to Iran. The army advanced towards us with 2000 soldiers, in 1920s. 
An important politician. [he stated that he cannot give his name] 
responded to my father. Then Osman Agha said “Soldiers are coming 
against us”. They had lots of money, 2-3 flocks of sheep, silver, gold. 
They could not take anything, neither treasure nor food, just nothing. 
Only a blanket was put on each horse, for the women to ride, that was 
it… [The story of the escape and arrival to Iran] They passed Koçbaşı 
… [Staying in Iran and the myth of all the sons’ gathering there] We 
stayed in Iran till 1949. We stayed for 20 years. In 1930, we applied 
for amnesty, a special amnesty was granted. Then we migrated from 
Iran to Irak… [the story of this migration] My mother’s brother was 
a member of the first Assembly, a member of the Legislative 
Assembly. He, too, escaped. [the story of this escape] On the second 
night of my father’s escape to Iran, some soldiers came to the village, 
and asked “Who is the relative of Osman Agha, who is his imam, who 
is his clerk?” They killed two persons… [The story of the killings, the 
deaths were with mystified using religious motifs.] The killings took 
place near Gözlemez village, the corpses were thrown into the well. 
Nocourt hearing was held for these two persons. No one could 
denounce them out of fear. We were still in Iran… [he justifies why he 
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failed to prevent the deaths as a aşiret leader] In 1949, our villages 
were recorded in the ownership registers. I swear to God we could not 
take them back. When the cadastre came to the village, they asked for 
witnesses concerning our property rights, and the judges 
acknowledged us to be right, they said “These are theirs. You usurped 
(their property) when they went to Iran”. But they won the appeal, we 
could not get anything. We lost most of them. Recently, they handed 
over [the property] on their own accord. They [the Küresins] came 
later on, took half of the land, we could not do this [for Sırımlı 
village]” [from the interview with Ali İhsan Bey, on October 28, 
2002].  
 
In his comparative analysis of the ‘Hamidiye Regiments’ and ‘Village Guard System’ for the 
commonalities of state’s colonization, Aytar tells Ibrahim Pasha’s above-mentioned escape as 
follows: “In the period when the Kemalist movement tried to get the aşiret leaders and religious 
leaders in Kurdistan to its side with various promises and to squash those revolting, the Milli 
Aşiret revolted on June 8, 1920. This revolt was suppressed on the June 18th. Moved after the 
suppression of the revolt to Syria, 2-3 thousand members of the Milli Aşiret crossed the border 
either on horseback and camels, or on foot, and settling in Etşan village of Viranşehir they 
started another revolt, and cut the telegraph lines. In response to the Ottoman officers’ summons 
to surrender, the leaders of the Milan Aşiret demanded amnesty and compensation for their 
losses by the next evening. When their requirements were not met, the Milli Aşiret’s forces 
invaded Viranşehir on August 26th. However, after consecutive attacks by Turkish soldiers they 
were forced to migrate to Syria again on September 7
th
 (Aytar1992: 257).  
This information in the above paragraph was not mentioned by Ali İhsan Bey. According 
to him, Milan never revolted but was merely forced to cross the border. There are some important 
clues in his account: “being from the Hamidiye Regiments and a member of the first 
Assembly”, a sign hinting that the Milan had not fought either against the Republic nor the 
Ottomans and indeed they were more on the side of the state overall, rather than at war with it. 
We notice a similar discourse concerning the first years of the Republic: (TBMM Secret Session 
Records: 1338) Siverek Deputy Lütfi Bey on July 22
th
, says “…  Gentlemen, Kurdish soldiers, 
who are regarded as revolting defeated the French Army in Urfa, it was done by the Kurdish 
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aşirets who are considered revolting. Not by Nihad Pasha’s soldiers!” and he continues “Nihad 
Pasha, confusing origin with history perceived the Milli aşiret movement a revolt. I beg your 
pardon, he is the father of the Milan aşirets, even Abdülhamid once called him his son. He 
revolted one or two years before Independence… The current revolts are his ‘sons’. Let us not 
give it a revolt spirit on account of the rivalry between the aşirets.” (TBMM Secret Session 
Records 3, Volume 566). Similarly, in his research to expose the usefulness and mainly the 
leadership of the Haydaran tribe at the Ağrı Revolt, Süphandağ refers to the popular historian 
Cemal Kutay’s television speech in order to prove the leader of the Maku aşirets and Ağrı 
revolters, Kör Hüseyin Pasha’s role: “In a television speech, the famous historian Cemal Kutay 
was saying “Not Kazım Karabekir Pasha, but indeed Kör Hüseyin Pasha saved East Anatolia 
from the Russian and the Armenians” (Süphandağ 2001: 246).  
Mentioning Urfa and Suruç as the origins of the aşiret in Ali İhsan Bey’s narrative 
proves the aşiret’s Kurdish identity. With these statements Ali İhsan Bey simultaneously 
manifests the Kurdish origin of his aşiret and its pro-statist stance. The most important signifier 
of the Kurdish nationalism of the new era has its origin in Bohtan and Suruç. It remains 
controversial whether the Kurdish origin lies in Ağrı or Bohtan. However, in the new era, it was 
decided to bring forth Bohtan and Suruç as the origins for the creation of the Kurdish nation. Ali 
İhsan Bey recognizes and employs this code.  
“The war with the Şemsikans” is told to signify aşiret’s migration experience in the past 
and ‘the courage attributed to a good soldier in migrant culture’. The sentence mentioning “a 
great politician” is significant here as well, the implication being that this great politician could 
be one of the greatest since he cannot be mentioned by name (such as Atatürk or İsmet İnönü); 
what is emphasized here is that the Milan can address a great politician because of its own 
grandeur or because it was normal for it to draw the attention of a great politician. Henceforth, 
the story relates the aşiret’s arrival to Turkey in 1949 after 20 years exile in Iran-Maku-Irak 
following a special amnesty, and its subsequent failure to get its usurped lands back (as a result of 
the court of  appeal’s persistent rejection of the local court’s decision). In brief, it is a story of an 
exile caused by a conflict with the Republic, which, in spite of the return after 20 years following 
the special amnesty, remains a story of landlessness. By saying that 
‘We were of use to the state’ and [At the discretion of Iranian Shah (evrak-ı 
halise)] we were offered possession, oxen and seedbeds… [the opportunities 
offered by the Iranian Shah and a story of wealth] …. We rejected those aids as 
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well, and we told to ourselves, let us return to our own country, in any case 
amnesty will be issued” [from the interview with Ali İhsan Bey, on October 28, 
2002].  
Ali İhsan Bey provides clues for the earlier conflicts of the migrant Kurdish aşirets with 
the Republic and then their rapprochement with the DP government.  
Nevertheless it is interesting that the Milan do become landowners later on. Categorized 
as “them”, the Küresins is a non-agha aşiret settled around the Van region in the wake of the 
Simko Agha revolt. Even today there are deeply-rooted conflicts between this aşiret structure and 
the Milan. In many villages such as Sırımlı, Değirmigöl, etc. there are dual structures. Ali İhsan 
Bey simultaneously others the Küresins and reveals how they themselves handed over their lands 
to the Milan (in the last twenty years).  
From the first years of the Republic onwards, the Milan aşiret is stigmatized by the state 
as follows “They joined the revolt. One cannot trust their devotedness to our country. The Agha 
system prevails in the aşiret. They are semi-nomads.” (Aşirets Report 1998: 349). Kazım 
Karabekir Pasha describes the aşirets around Van-Bitlis-Ağrı and Muş as ‘mutineers, ill-
tempered, plunderers, … calm’ in his reports; entitled ‘Three Aşirets in the Fırka District’, the K8 
report classifies the Milan in the same sub-tribe system with Celâl, Şivili, Takavi, etc. Aşirets. In 
his analysis of the Dersim revolts, Karabekir Pasha others these Kurds as such: “The 
relationships between the aşirets are not auspicious. How can they be, generally among the 
Kurds family sentiments come after their interests. A brother shoots his brother to replace him 
in the leadership… In Muş women are exchanged for goods” (Karabekir 1995: 76). 
The Milan aşiret’s main trouble with the Republic started with the Ağrı Revolt. It is the 
same revolt which is mentioned in the book published by Kaynak Publishing House and claimed 
to belong to the General Staff In 1925, because some of the feudal aghas and aşiret leaders 
wanted to be exiled together with the Milan, the aşirets revolted against the Republic (Kalman 
1996: 77); this period ended with an general revolt and their eventual banishment by the 
Republic. Even though somewhat later a special amnesty was issued for some groups, the Milan 
remained in exile till 1949. 
How can we analyze this narrative that conflates the meta-discourse of being ‘a devout 
subject of the state’ and the sub-discourse of being ‘Kurdish and against’? The Milan describe 
themselves first as ‘rebellious, traditional (fighting with other aşirets) in the past but pro-statist in 
fact’, and later as ‘a disillusioned society which came about as a result of unfulfilled promises’. 
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Zizek defines this as ‘a new situation built upon collective guilt’ (Zizek 1989). However, 
including Zizek, those who produce politics based on the collective construction discourse do so 
as a way to explicate the predominance of the meta-power spaces on the sub-spaces. In other 
words, this way is only a one-way construction of the subaltern; it is called power oppression to 
which the subaltern is subjected to. However, in addition to the socius’s constant reconstruction 
of itself and its story, the reactions of all micro-units’ as well as that of the state should be taken 
into consideration. Hence it can be assumed that the Milan attempted to create a story on ‘double 
guiltiness’: Even though they declared their loyalty to the Republic (first guilt: betrayal of the 
Kurds), they were sent to exile and thus revolted (second guilt: betrayal of the Republic); 
utilizing the bargaining mechanisms (third guilt: betrayal of the Iranian Shah) returning to the 
country (forth guilt: bargaining to take the lands back using the ones executed) and the revolt for 
triggered by their inability to regain their lands. In response to the question: ‘Why the Milan did 
not revolt after the 33 Bullets Incident? If it was that big, rooted and strong, why did it not deal 
with this issue within the traditional structures?’ Ali İhsan Bey answers ‘We were in Iran, the 
state was very strong, and a hundred people more would have died’. However, in another 
interview he stated that “the Milan has left the call to account to a later date”. For the new 
period, that is for the early PKK period, the Küresins explain that “The issue of calling to account 
did not turn into blood-shed, but the problem increased. An atmosphere of ‘you are not from us’ 
was emerging. Having heard this, the Küresins were drawing near the soldiers.” This statement 
clarifies ‘the handover of the Milan’s lands voluntarily, in the recent period’.   
Zizek interprets the sharp shock caused by the confrontation of collective feeling of guilt 
with reality as ‘a point of reality, at the heart of the subject, non-symbolized, produced as a waste, 
as a leftover of the every kind of processes of giving meaning’ (Zizek. 1989, 195). Naming this 
point the ‘points de capiton’ (nodal points). Zizek states that ‘The signifier does not correspond 
entirely to the set of signifies, the signifier always free-floats. “In other words, what is crucial in 
any analysis of ideology is to detect, behind the apparently transcendental meaning of the 
element holding it together, this tautological, performative, fundamentally self-referential 
operation, in which it is not so much some pre-existing meaning that things refer to as an empty 
signifier that is retrospectively seen as what is being referred to. This ideological points de 
capiton or master-signifier is not some underlying unity but only the difference between elements, 
only what its various mentions have in common: the signifier itself as pure difference” (Zizek 
1989: 249). 
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Ali İhsan Bey’s discourse defines the Milan’s present situation anew for the new situation 
within the framework of past patterns (feelings of guilt, interpreting the encounter with the 
researcher as a meeting with a more social dimension of the state, the excuses for the betrayal, the 
rebellion against injustices and against being betrayed) At this points de capiton the past is 
reconstructed, the legacy of the past (the tradition to fight; the invasion of the  lands of the 
Şemsikan, the revolt against the Republic;  the escape to Iran at the outset of the Ağrı Revolt; the 
exile and the bargaining) is reformulated in terms of betrayal, guilt and excuses which come to 
form the basis the ideological discourse of the Milan’s role in  recent history.  
Simmel says ‘There are two kinds of lie’: It is the most superficial and dissociate lie 
which directs the words away from the thoughts: This lie looks as if it did not belong to the 
person; it merely arises on the boundary between him and the outside world. The real lie is the 
one in which the words are compatible with the thoughts, but the thought contradicts the reality 
situated deeper inside us; when our soul is dichotomous in itself. (Simmel 2000: 34). Due to its 
characteristic which is said to the outside world but which we know is also directed to ourselves 
it is this kind of lie which directs socius to defy its entire life and to reconstruct it; thus, the Milan 
and the Turkish Republic reconstruct themselves and each other: hence the discourse of 
constructive guiltiness in the Milan is constructed upon collective guilt.  
 
b- THE LEGITIMIZATION OF THE DENOUNCEMENT TRADITION: “The Küresins 
have betrayed us” 
 
One of the most evident results of the study was “the approval of the denouncement tradition”. 
Even the villagers asked immediately, “Find the denouncer for us. You must know his name, you 
are the scholar, give us his name”. As the forms of legitimization, complaints and results of the 
‘denouncement tradition’ gradually emerged in the course of there search, a new core question 
started to take shape: “why and how was the denunciation process operated and who won in the 
end?” 
The 33 Bullet Incident is entirely based on an invisible denouncement process and sub-
models of discontent analysis. İsmail Beşikçi conveys the incident as in Dr. Captain Raşit 
Ersezer’s statement that was supported by the TBMM Session Reports and Minutes Journals. 
According to these documents, the real causes of the incident originated from a disagreement 
over livestock smuggling between the Milan and the Memikan tribes, and as a result of 
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denunciation reached this point. The chieftain of the Milan tribe Muhemmedi Misdo ‘betrayed’ 
his fellow- villagers; in fact he is a spy of the Turks, a traitor (Beşikçi 1992, 27, 40, 31; Göktaş 
1991b, 63-67). According to Aslan, the ones who started the incident, tolerated, encouraged and 
were personally involved in border smuggling were the battalions and the soldiers at the border. 
Aslan infers this remark from the trial records: “All of the property smuggling incidents to Iran 
and similar practices and behavior were realized under the initiative of the 226 Regiment and the 
2
nd
 Border Battalion” (Aslan 1989, 20). The common point in the two writers’ statements is 
significant: the 33 Bullets Incident can be read in different ways according to each period and 
situation, hence the ‘fiction of the real’ can be re-constructed.  
In fact, it is possible to modify the social readings politically without the entirety of 
reality; in the nomadic past there were periodic disagreements between the Milan and the 
Memikan Aşirets. Ali İhsan Bey himself confirms the presence of the denouncers within the 
Milan: “There were denouncers among us and among the others, there were the faithless”. 
Even the response to the question ‘Who is the friend and who is the foe of the Milan?’ can be “it 
depends on the period”. However when asked about the dates one by one, the Şemsikan, Takuri, 
Pinyanişi, Mikuri, Memikan and the Küresin Aşirets were designated as the social groups the 
Milan had disputes with from time to time both in the past and in the present. The disputes with 
the Şemsikan date back to the nomadic past; those with the Takuri, Pinyanişi and Mikuri to the 
time of the Ağrı Revolts; with the Memikan to the 1940s in  Republican times; and with the 
Küresins to both the former historical periods and to the more recent ones, 1950 and after. It is 
significant here who in each period was used by the villagers in constructing their ‘other’ and 
how they reconstruct their fiction of the state. Important are the traces this fiction leaves in 
villagers’ minds. Two of the most important political strategies of the Ottoman leadership and 
state tradition which aimed as co-opting various groups included the ‘sowing the seeds of 
discord’ and ‘the perpetuation of denouncement mechanisms’. The research has revealed that, 
taking sides is a central political strategy and as a consequence the idea that ‘the denouncer is 
approved and wins in every period’ has left its mark in the minds and socius of the villagers  
The targets set by the villagers and by the Milan leader in the past and the present can be 
differentiated in spite of this reconstruction. This reconstruction is articulated in sentences like 
“We do not let the refugees pass, the Şemsikans do” or “The drug trade is the most humiliating 
way of earning money for us but for them [people in Yüksekova/Başkale] it is an accepted way to 
earn a living” or “We earn our money from oil, not hashish or gun”, These in turn shape the 
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social ‘othering’ and their choice of those elements which they wish to foreground in this 
process. . Subsequently, the sub-discourse of the real unease unfolds as follows:  
 “Wherever there is a dishonest person, he makes denunciations. There 
are some also in our village, they are engaged in both smuggling and 
denouncement”, “… took from … village. [The accused of this incident was a 
village belonging to the Küresin tribe] He said ‘we are taking it to Van’. He got 
27.000 dollars. As soon as he took the money, he made accusations against a 
group of the PKK. They searched for the men with a helicopter. Nine people 
died. Afterwards a woman takes off her scarf and waves it. They look down and 
see that these are women, children, not terrorists” “Our people did it again, 
they denounced others.” “They slandered each other”; “Here! Smugglers. All 
were rich, respected names… They took them by name… Certainly there are 
not many honest people around” [From interviews in Sırımlı and Değirmigöl, 
September 2002]   
These passages suggest the belief concerning the presence and operation of the 
denouncement tradition. The expressions “There was not enmity; the problem was the cattle… 
Look, the district governor, was an Armenian...”, “The denouncers acted faithlessly as infidels” 
stress the words ‘Armenian’ and ‘infidel’. 
Despite the differences in the villagers’ statements about who made the denouncements, 
these statements clearly pinpoint the period when  which the accusations refer to: For instance, 
whereas the elderly who rarely leave the village name the enemy of the olden days as the 
denouncer (“There is the Şemsikan Aşiret, see, they are filthy”); those who have more authority 
within the aşiret and are familiar with the political dynamism of the new era and are therefore  
closer to the claims of central power (leaders) identify the ‘other’ of the new era as the 
denouncers: “The Küresins denounced us!” 
Who are the Küresins? The Küresins are described by the Kurds as a Turkish-Sunni tribe 
without an agha comprising 50-60 villages in Iran and the same number of settlements on the 
Turkish side. According to some articles published by the Kaynak Publishing House which are 
said to have been authored by the General Staff, the Küresins are a tribe with a population of 
4700, speak Kurdish (Kurmanci) and Turkish: “Denomination: Shafi’I, Chieftains: 1) Yemen 
(Emin) the son of Maksut, Erçek Subdistrict, Arıtoprak village; 2) Hüseyin İsa, Ermişler village, 
… Opinions: They did not participate in the revolt. They are loyal to our country. They recognize 
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Erdoğan Agha from Iran as their chieftain (Tribes Report 1998: 347-8). During his 
commandership at the 7
th
 Tribe Cavalry Division in Ağrı between 1921-1926, Süleyman Sabri 
Pasha wrote in his ‘Van History’: “Nowadays the Şikaks call the Haremians (called by European 
historians the Horzum Turks during the Crusades) Küresins as Korasmen… The Küresins say 
that they originate from the Samsun region. They live within the Iranian border region.” 
(Süleyman Sabri Pasha 1982: 45) and elsewhere, “There is a Turkish tribe which started to 
change five-six year ago”. By saying “They inhabit the vicinity of the city of  Dilman in 
Azerbaijan; they joined the Şikak Tribe because they had been threatened by them; they put aside 
their papak and büzmeli and started wearing külah and felt waistcoat (Thus they adjusted their 
clothes to their new identity, status and nationality) and they assumed  the name ‘Küresin tribe’. 
Naturally, they do not know Kurdish” (1982: 69). In fact the author tries to prove that the Küresin 
and many other tribes in the region are indeed Turkish.   
The Küresins define themselves as follows: 
 
“We have relatives in Çaldıran and Başkale. The Küresin Sunnis live in 
Turkey, the Kuresin Shiis in Iran. We also have relatives from the Urmiye region, 
but they are too far away in the south from the border. Damlacık [Raşik-Akspi], 
Aşağı Tulgalı [Ahrok Jer], Yukarı Tulgalı [Ahrok Jor], Aşağı Sağmallı [Noşar], 
Koçkıran, Oymaklı, Bakışık [Azverk], the half of Roşar, Sırımlı, Velican, Başkale, 
Teyseren, 10-15 villages around Çaldıran. They are all ours. There is no tribal 
system. About 40-50 years ago, Hüseyin Bey from Aşağı Tulgalı was the agha. We 
have relatives in Yukarı Tulgalı. Previously this village was in Çaldıran. In Yukarı 
Sağmallı. My grandfather took this village, they settled here. It was given to them 
by the state. His father was village headman, then he handed over his position to 
my uncle, after his death it received this name” [from interviews in Damlacık 
(Raşik-Reşko-Akspi) village, September 2002].  
“It was a hamlet of Yukarı Tulgalı in 1952. They moved there [to this 
village] in 1959… Simko Agha oppressed those [the Kuresins] immensely, so they 
sided with Iran. Some of them escaped to this side… Kur-hessinen, means 
Hessinnin-from Kuresin, son of Hasan…We are Sunni, Kurdish, but Sunni. Not 
Shafii… We arrived here in the 1920s. They came to the Dileman [Şapur] Kotur 
region. They moved and settled down here after Iran had instigated war between 
them and the Persians,. Previously this village had been empty. The state made 
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them settle here. A part of the Küresins remained within the Milan. We are from 
the Kuresin Kurds. The Persian Kurds are in Şapur” [from the interview with the 
Kuresin in Damlacık village, September 2002]. 
However, these stories of escape and return are not verified by the Kurds 
outside the Milan Aşiret.  
“Some of them is a random assemblage, the others are Acem [Azerbaijans 
from Iran]. Our nation does not like the Acem [Azerbeijani] at all… They were 
forced to pay homage to Simko Agha , and then when Simko agha was defeated, 
the state gathered them and granted them a few houses… They always support the 
stronger side. Those from Özalp, especially by the people from Başkale are 
known as the spies of the entire Van area, and. [from the interviews with Kurds in 
Özalp district, September 2002]  
In the narratives of the Küresins siding with the state and being rewarded for this appear 
as the main themes: A special emphasis on being Sunni is a manifestation of the aforementioned 
ambition ‘to be Muslim’. An even more striking statement is: “We are Sunnis, Kurdish but still 
Sunnis. We are not Shafiis”. 
Shafiism is a sub-branch of Sunnism, and the Küresins’ statement may be seen as a lack 
of information or misinformation. In fact, statement implies something else: being ‘Kurmanci 
speakers, Shafii and from Bohtan have become the main signifiers of Kurdish nationalism in the 
last period. Hence, by emphasizing their non-Shafii identity, the Küresins state their Kurdishness 
and simultaneously distance themselves from Kurdish nationalists.  
These codes demand attention as forms of ‘othering’, “This village was empty when we 
arrived”, “The state settled us here” or “Some of the Küresins remained within the Milan”. 
The Milan tell the story the other way around.: “The Küresins occupied the villages which they 
found empty” As far as the question “whether they had cooperated with Simko Agha or not” is 
concerned, the answers reveal the real reason behind the Küresin’s real or alleged loyalty to the 
state: “The Persians have always been much closer to the state” [interview in Sırımlı village]. 
Ali İhsan Bey says, “The Küresins were h(x)ulam [i. e. farmhand or slave]. “But the Küresin 
nationality is devoted to their denomination, regardless of the language they speak, their imams 
are also Sunni” [interview with Ali İhsan Bey]. 
Göktaş’s narratives on the Iranian Azerbaijani-Kurd conflict represent an important part 
of recent Kurdish nationalist constructions. Göktaş constructs the Persians as ‘the other’ within 
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the story of the establishment of the Mehabad Kurdish Republic. “The Azeris never wanted to 
recognize the Kurds’ will to draw the borders of their own country. Therefore, Azeris started to 
occupy one by one the regions and the cities which are also claimed by Kurds. Hence they seized 
the cities Hoy, Rizaiye and Meyanduwab. The Kurds had been claiming their right to sovereignty 
over certain parts of these three cities, if not all of them” (Göktaş 1991b: 38). 
As for Türkdoğan, he calls the Küresins the Kasımoğlu community. According to him the 
Küresins are a Sunni Azeri group and “Kür in Persian means’ much, many’. Indeed, they had 
migrated here from Iran en masse. This separation was mostly a reaction to Iran’s desire to 
convert this Sunni group to Shiism. the Kasımoğlu Küresins are a group around the Van region 
with strong national sentiments,  who are  proud of being Turkish. According to their statements, 
there is not one single person among the Küresins who has joined to PKK and the terror. Şamil 
Efendi declares this with pride: ‘We are Turks and proud of being Turkish. We are against the 
PKK and Kurdish tendencies down to the end” (Türkdoğan 1998: 43). This statement of the 
Küresins given to Türkdoğan in 1994 can be taken as an indication of their way of dealing with 
being ‘othered’ at that period.  
The current narrative of the Küresin leaders is as follows:  
 “Many Küresins have migrated. They have left. They can be called statists. 
Upon their arrival, the Kurds continue to settle in Saray. This migration still goes 
on. Every month 3-4 families [of the Küresins] leave Saray. And Van as well… 
They had arrived to Iran from Azerbaijan. They settled in Hoy and its 
surroundings. From there, they had to come here because of the conflicts between 
the Kurds and the Persians. My uncle was a soldier of Simko Agha. In the years 
1928-9. They arrived here in 1932. Escaping from Simko… The Armenians were 
here when they came. But they escaped. While escaping, a family moved in with 
my parents’ – they stayed for 5-6 months. All the fountains belong to the 
Armenians; the name Saray derives from Serav, which means ‘a place with 
abundant water, subaşı’ [fountain]. There are around 40 kehriz [cistern and 
channels]. All of them belong to the Armenians. The Küresins were used by the 
state. That is to say, when the Küresins arrived, the state was in opposition to the 
aghas… Thus they do not like the Küresins… Their relations with Kurds can 
only be explained with their knowledge of Kurdish. The group with my father 
arrived in the village of Hındıgan… There are Küresin-only villages. The ones 
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inhabited by the Şahmeyer have also remained pure. There are people among 
them who do not speak Kurdish at all. The Kuresins’ residence is situated in the 
interior. There is no need for protection. In the past the aghas could not exert 
much influence here. Nothing could be done to Sahveret Aslan. He died a natural 
death" [interviews with the Küresin leaders in Özalp district, September 2002].  
This statement first and foremost demonstrates to what degree the ‘othered’ tries to 
project itself closer to the center. “Küresins against the aghas” and “taking sides with the state” 
are underlined frequently. A similar statement can be found in Türkdoğan's quotations, such as 
“being Turk or / and Azeri” and “opposing PKK”. 
“Arrived after escaping from Simko” is underlined especially. Therefore does being 
disobedient to Simko Agha mean being reyet (the plural of reaya)? (Bruinessen 1998: 131; 152) 
Nikitin mentions the letter the subjects and the nomads of the Nahcevan Khanate presented to 
Kerim Han Zend in 1768, in which they requested 'to be protected from xolam [golâm, i.e. 
household slave] enslavement'. “The golâm either inherited this status from his father or was 
bought for by money or came from among the foreigners. But the Nahcevan villagers are reyet 
and nomads should not be made golâm”. Hence the Küresins are reyet. Minorsky agrees that the 
aghas are conquerors and the reyets are another race. It is impossible for these two groups to 
mix (Nikitin 1991: 224). Remembered as those 'disobedient to Simko Agha', the Küresins carry 
the hardly visible traces of the reaya period. Once we project this to earlier historical periods, we  
realize that the Küresins intend to remind us an earlier past when they had played a useful role: 
“In order to attain sovereignty, the Ottoman used Kurdish tribes, including even Idris Bitlisi, 
against the Anatolian Turkmens in 1514” (İnalcık 1999: 68). 
The interviews show that what the two groups share is the anxiety which may be called 
the “traditionalization of denouncement”:  
The Milans state that: 
“Pastoral nomadism is difficult, the border is a prohibited zone, and there 
is no permission. But now, if we decide to go with you, even if we were to go to 
Iran with 20 people, the gendarme would not know about it. But again there will 
be denouncers among us.” The Küresins complain about the same problem: “Our 
real problem is denouncement, we can do anything but for the traitors among us; 
if only there were no denouncements!... The border villages do not let us go in” 
[in order to smuggle fuel]. 
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The Milans have the tendency to impute the guilt to the denouncer: 
“You denounce, and he is a soldier! The bullet does not know whether the person coming is clean 
or a smuggler?”  
 
WHO IS SPEAKING? 
'Who' is speaking? Once we become conscious of being the wretched of the earth, that is, of 
opposing colonialism with an oppressed mind, we comprehend that this injured consciousness 
(Shayegan 1997) cannot ever be transformed into a collective outburst of awareness. Spivak 
herself gave a negative answer to the question “can the subaltern really speak?” (Spivak 2000). 
Many writers have shown that the oppressed mind could only speak through a scream which may 
be understood only after long sessions of listening. However we need to ask: Who is speaking? 
The answers to this question traveled from Laclau to Spivak, from Connerton to Hall, then to 
Adorno. Today forms of settling accounts with the past are evaluated from various directions, 
ranging from classical liberalism to right laicism, from  the liberal left and from the new 
Ottomans to the new left.  
'Who' is speaking when the Milan speaks? Those families in Sırımlı and Degirmigöl 
which have suffered losses? The pain of these losses and the narratives of the survivors and the 
narratives of the Aşiret’s leader are of a very different nature. The Aşiret’s members' attempts to 
survive and lead a quiet life only cannot be evaluated on the same level as the chieftains' attempts 
for survival who have enjoyed the support of various right wing parties. Stuart Hall underscores 
the necessity to observe the narrators' life worlds and class-based power dynamics. In the Milan's 
aspiration to investigate its memories and to avoid being the ‘other’ it is possible to discover the 
wish to revitalize an older memory as well. All the previous references of the Milan's chieftain 
such as ‘Not being one of the rebels, Hamidiye Regiments, loyalty towards Abdülhamit and the 
Republic, degrading the Türkmen-Azeris’ tend to construct a point de capiton along with an 
earlier past. On the other hand the chieftain pinpoints another point de capiton: Statements 
concerning “Kurdish nationalism nourished by masculine elements” and “the rooted-ness of the 
Milan lineage” imply the immediate possibility of re-constructing new balances and the 
awareness that these balances will be based upon power and authority as it has hitherto been.
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'Who' is speaking when the Küresins speak? The reyet, who has an understanding of the 
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 Zizek’s points out to “back to the future of consciousness” (Zizek 2002). 
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past and the present and who in the past were always left outside of the Aşiret or agha structures, 
is partly conscious of the fact that its ties with the Republic have brought them no power. The 
reason behind the overemphasis of the Simko Agha period and their later activities against the 
PKK initiative lie precisely in their attempts for rapprochement and reminding. To put it more 
correctly, they call attention to the impossibility of the existence of the lower forms of 
landlessness within the Republic, even though they were outside of the tribe and agha system, 
and to the unchanging lower status of the reyet throughout the Republic. Recently, the reyet 
intends to re-construct its old capitons using traditional methods..  
If the analysis so far has been read as that of a spy story or has confirmed the view that 
“what needs to happen, will happen”, we need to take a breath and re-think social responsibility: 
the relations of power and self-interest surrounding the social structure cannot be adequately 
examined within the framework of “rational calculations”. One can observe their rational 
consequences, influences on identity constructions and traces left in social memory. Therefore 
neither the micro/chronological explanations nor the macro/achronic ones can show us the unity 
of the social structure. These two grounds need to be considered in a relational and diachronic 
manner; and it should be examined how the rational (power and self-interest calculations) and the 
irrational (identity and memory) mutually modify each other.  
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